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THE STAKES MATTER:
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF HYPOTHETICAL
BIAS IN CASE EVALUATION AND THE
CURATIVE POWER OF ECONOMIC

INCENTIVES
DANIEL

R. CAHOY t AND MIN DINGtt
INTRODUCTION

Jury research plays a critical role in the modern legal
environment. In the private dispute context, trial consulting
companies commonly run mock trial simulations in order to
determine the effect of facts or issues particular to a client's
case. 1 Additionally, a growing number of courts employ a
technique known as a summary jury trial that makes use of a
surrogate jury to provide information on the relative strength of
each party's case in order to motivate settlement. 2 In the
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1 See Franklin Strier & Donna Shestowsky, Profiling the Profilers:A Study of
the Trial Consulting Profession, Its Impact on Trial Justice, and What, If Anything,
To Do About It, 1999 WIs. L. REV. 441, 456 (1999) ("Consultants report spending the
greatest percentage of their consulting time on mock trial simulations, followed by
case theory/presentation and focus groups, respectively."); Stephanie Leonard
Yarbrough, The Jury Consultant-Friendor Foe of Justice, 54 SMU L. REV. 1885,
1893-94 (2001) (noting that "[m]ock trials are one of the most popular instruments
used by jury consultants.").
2 See Harry T. Edwards, Alternate Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?,
99 HARv. L. REV. 668, 673 & n.16 (1986) (stating that a "summary jury trial" was
introduced by Judge Lambros and was modeled after the mini-trial).
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academic context, experimental studies on jury behavior are
undertaken to uncover the biases, preconceptions and emotional
triggers that influence the behavior of juries. 3 Such studies are
critically important to the judicial system for determining the
best ways to mitigate (or at least anticipate) the effects of racism,
4
sexism, and economic bias.
However, the use of simulated or "mock" juries has serious
limitations and disadvantages. Most significantly, researchers in
the field acknowledge the possibility that the hypothetical nature
of jury simulation studies leads to subject behavior that differs
from that of real jurors.5 This so-called "consequentiality" or
"hypothetical bias" manifests as a barrier to eliciting reliable
responses from participants in a laboratory setting.6 It occurs
because the real-world decision-making incentives that flow from
the impact of the decision are lacking. Simply put, a participant
may make choices other than what he or she would if the study
conditions were real; the stakes can matter, and the failure to
account for them can be very problematic. Interestingly, the
potential for skewed results in jury studies is concern enough
that even the U.S. Supreme Court has commented on the
3 See Daniel R. Cahoy & Min Ding, Using Experimental Economics To Peek into
the "Black Box" of Jury Behavior: A Proposalfor Jury Research Reform, 14 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 31, 37, 44, 48 (2004) (discussing the reasons for conducting jury
research and the problems associated with those studies).
4 See id. at 37.
5 See NORMAN J. FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE 58-61 (1995) (discussing the
advantages and disadvantages of the experimental method); ROBERT J. MACCOUN,
GETTING INSIDE THE BLACK BOX: TOWARD A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF CIVIL JURY

BEHAVIOR 14 (1987); Brian H. Bornstein & Sean G. McCabe, Jurors of the Absurd?
The Role of Consequentiality in Jury Simulation Research, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
443, 444, 448, 455 (2005) (stating from a theoretical perspective that "one limitation
seems insurmountable, as it is the sine qua non of a simulation; namely, no matter
how realistic a simulation is, it is still just a simulation," and describing academic
criticism of the hypothetical nature of jury studies); Ronald Dillehay & Michael
Nietzel, Constructing a Science of Jury Behavior, in REVIEW OF PERSONALITY AND

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 253-54 (L. Wheeler ed., 1980) (discussing the problems with
common jury research methods and stating that "[w]e are skeptical that the
prototypical jury analogue is capable of capturing the complex socialization
processes which are produced by the jury experience"); Shari Seidman Diamond,
Illuminations and Shadows from Jury Simulations, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 561,
566 (1997) (concluding after reviewing the results of more detailed modern jury
studies that "we can take some comfort that our efforts to invest more resources in
the jury simulation paradigm have been justified," and acknowledging that "even
these more elaborate simulations cannot avoid some of the inevitable uncertainties
that research can reduce, but not avoid").
6 See Cahoy & Ding, supra note 3, at 48.
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problem. 7 While the actual impact of hypothetical bias on the
reliability of mock jury studies is open to question,8 it is clear
that research into the issue is necessary and relevant.
The phenomenon of hypothetical bias is well characterized in
the experimental literature of many social science fields. 9 Not
surprisingly, various methods of reducing its effects have been
developed. 10 Generally, the standard model involves the use of a
reward or compensation that is directly linked to a participant's
response. 1 ' Unfortunately, existing economic models for such
amelioration are not useful in the context of jury studies due to
their unique incentive structure. Specifically, juries 12 are not
7 See, e.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 171 (1986) (criticizing jury studies
cited to the court, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that they "were based on the
responses of individuals randomly selected from some segment of the population, but
who were not actual jurors sworn under oath to apply the law to the facts of an
actual case involving the fate of an actual capital defendant" and that "[w]e have
serious doubts about the value of these studies in predicting the behavior of actual
jurors").
8 See Robert J. MacCoun, Comparing Legal Factfinders: Real and Mock,
Amateur and Professional, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 511, 513-14 (2005) (conceding the
possibility that mock juror behavior differs from real juror behavior, but arguing
that there is little evidence that the differences are asymmetric rather than in
magnitude); Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries
(Should) Make Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 7-8 (1997) (noting that mock
jury studies elicit the most concern of all jury experiments, but arguing that such
worries are "out of proportion to the problems" of such research given that effects
from the methodologies employed are not necessarily relevant to the variable under
study).
9 See Richard C. Bishop & Thomas A. Heberlein, Does Contingent Valuation
Work?, in RONALD CUMMINGS ET AL., VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS: A STATE OF
THE ARTS ASSESSMENT OF CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD 149, 151 (1986)
(analyzing the effect hypothetical bias had on several hunters' choices whether to
sell their permits); Min Ding et al., Incentive Aligned Conjoint Analysis, 42 J.
MARKETING RES. 67, 67-68 (2005) (testing hypothetical bias through a field
experiment in a Chinese restaurant); John A. List, Do Explicit Warnings Eliminate
the Hypothetical Bias in Elicitation Procedures? Evidence from Field Auctions for
Sportscards, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1498, 1501-02 (2001) (analyzing the effect of
hypothetical bias in a sportscard auction experiment); John A. List & Jason F.
Shogren, The Deadweight Loss of Christmas: Comment, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 1350,
1354 (1998) (studying the effect hypothetical bias can have on Christmas gift
purchases).
10 See List, supra note 9, at 1498.
11 Alvin E. Roth, Introduction to ExperimentalEconomics, in THE HANDBOOK OF
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 6 (John Kagel & Alvin Roth eds., 1995) (noting that in
as early as the 1940s, criticism regarding hypothetical choices in economics
experiments became widely acknowledged as a result of a paper by W. Allen Wallis
and Milton Friedman, and since that time the use of real incentives have become a
fundamental aspect of experimental economics).
12 The term "jury" is used herein to refer to petit juries as opposed to grand
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motivated by the potential for personal gain, but instead are
called upon to make just decisions for others. A novel approach
to capture this incentive is necessary.
This paper proposes a remedy for the problem of hypothetical
bias in jury studies that is translatable to existing modalities.
We begin in Part I by providing background from the relevant
literature, exposing hypothetical bias in other, limited contexts.
In Part II, the paper describes a mechanism specifically designed
to align incentives in jury studies, articulating its economic basis
and components. Finally, in Part III, the paper presents the
results of two experiments that demonstrate the utility of the
incentive structure and provides a roadmap for future work in
this area.

I. DESCRIPTIONS OF HYPOTHETICAL BIAS IN THE SOCIAL
SCIENCE LITERATURE AS A PARTIAL ROADMAP FOR A REMEDY
Whenever an individual is called upon to essentially predict
what he or she would do in a given circumstance, there is a
potential for hypothetical bias. In the context of jury simulation
research, the phenomenon is certainly acknowledged, but
infrequently studied.13 According to a recent survey of the
literature, only five studies have directly addressed the issue,
and the results are now at least twenty years old.14
Unfortunately, this limited body of research is ultimately
juries. A petit jury is a panel of persons from the community empanelled to
determine factual issues in the context of a trial, a long-standing tradition in the
United States. See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 176-77 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the use of petit juries has been described at least as early as
1164).
13 See MacCoun, supra note 8, at 512 (observing that "[r]eaders outside the jury
research community might be surprised to find so little attention given to ... the
consequentiality issue").
14 See Bornstein & McCabe, supra note 5, at 452 & n.39. Noted researcher,
Brian Bornstein, led this comprehensive assessment of the issue of consequentiality
in jury studies in 2005, and it provides a helpful picture of the state of the research
to date. The studies cited by Bornstein and McCabe are: Shari Seidman Diamond &
Hans Zeisel, A Courtroom Experiment on Juror Selection and Decision-Making, 1
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 276 (1974); David W. Wilson & Edward
Donnerstein, Guilty or Not Guilty? A Look at the "Simulated"Jury Paradigm, 7 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 175 (1977); Norbert L. Kerr et al., Role Playing and the
Study of Jury Behavior, 7 SOC. METHODS & RES. 337 (1979); David Suggs & John J.
Berman, Factors Affecting Testimony About Mitigating Circumstances and the
Fixing of Punishment, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 251 (1979); and Martin F. Kaplan &
Sharon Krupa, Severe Penalties Under the Control of Others Can Reduce Guilt
Verdicts, 10 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1 (1986).
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inconclusive. 15
Four of the five studies found a direct or
interacting effect of role-playing and consequences on jury
behavior, 16 one found no effect, 17 and all suffer from some
methodological shortcomings that limit the objective reliability of
8
the results.'
On the other hand, a wealth of empirical evidence on
hypothetical bias exists in the experimental literature related to
the value subjects place on certain options or contingencies.
Diamond and Hausman 19 reviewed surveys that purported to
gauge how much value people placed on public goods, such as
cleaning up polluted rivers and lakes. 20 They concluded that the
discrepancy between the valuation stated under hypothetical
conditions and real-life responses was so profound that
information gleaned from contingent valuation surveys was
actually worse than no information at all. 21 Additionally, in a
study by Bishop and Heberlein, it was found that the amount of
money people were willing to spend for deer hunting permits was
overstated when compared to a situation in which they would
have to actually spend cash.22 List showed that sports card
dealers significantly overstate their bids for a sports card in a
hypothetical situation. 23 List and Shogren found the selling price
for a gift is significantly higher in an actual situation as
compared to a hypothetical. 24 Moreover, Ding, et al., recently
found that subjects were more price-sensitive and had a different

15 See Bornstein & McCabe, supra note 5, at 457 ("The results of the above
studies provide little general consensus about the effect of role-playing and
consequences on jury behavior.").
16 See Diamond & Zeisel, supra note 14, at 276-77; Kaplan & Krupa, supra note
14, at 8-13; Suggs & Berman, supra note 14, at 256; Wilson & Donnerstein, supra
note 14, at 185.
17 See Kerr et al., supra note 14, at 348.
18 See Bornstein & McCabe, supra note 5, at 457-60 (identifying such failings as
the lack of evidence that hypothetical bias had been manipulated successfully and
the failure to employ jury deliberations).
19Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, Contingent Valuation: Is Some
Number Better than No Number?, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 45 (1994).
20 Id. at 45-46.
21 See id. at 58-60 (discussing the "some number is better than no number"
fallacy).
22 See Bishop & Heberlein, supra note 9, at 157-58.
23 See List, supra note 9, at 1501-02.
24 List & Shogren, supra note 9, at 1354.
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preference structure for Chinese dinner specials when their
25
decisions resulted in actually eating the food.
Various behaviors have been posited to explain hypothetical
bias. For example, participants in hypothetical settings may be
shifting their behavior to an overly socially-desirable
presentation of themselves: "[w]hen incentives are low subjects
say they would be more risk-preferring and generous than they
actually are when incentives are increased." 26 Additionally, there
may be less heterogeneity among the respondents in hypothetical
situations (e.g., they may be more likely to conform to the social
norm or to answers expected by their peers). 27 In general,
answers under hypothetical conditions are inconsistent, erratic,
and, in many cases, untrustworthy. 28 Finally, participants may
discount things that would be important in real-world contexts
29
(e.g., budget constraints).
To correct the hypothetical bias, non-legal experimenters
normally incorporate incentives that parallel their real-world
counterparts, and motivate the respondents by linking their
decisions to a reward amount. 30 However, jury research has
often utilized a different approach to address the lack of realism.
The standard practice, favored by research psychologists and jury
consultants, is to make the experimental conditions as real as
possible (e.g., by using live actors, formal settings, etc.) while
allowing the consequences of the participants' decision to remain
hypothetical. 3 1 The idea is that more realistic surroundings will

25

Ding et al., supra note 9, at 70.

26 Colin F. Camerer & Robin M. Hogarth, The Effects of FinancialIncentives in

Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-ProductionFramework, 19 J. RISK AND
UNCERTAINTY 7, 8 (1999) (analyzing a meta study of seventy-four research papers
which explored the impact of various financial incentives on the behavior of
experimental subjects).
27 See id. at 8-9.
28 See, e.g., id. at 8; Vernon L. Smith & James M. Walker, Monetary Rewards
and Decision Cost in Experimental Economics, 31 ECON. INQUIRY 245, 251-52 (1993)
(reviewing experimental literature involving varying incentive structures in
hypothetical situations).
29 Vernon L. Smith, Experimental Economics: Induced Value Theory, 66 AM.
ECON. REV. 274, 277-78 (1976) (describing an experiment, in which, subjects
imagining themselves making a five cent commission on each contract was "not real
enough to induce many contracts").
20 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
31 See FINKEL, supra note 5, at 59-60; Cahoy & Ding, supra note 3, at 48;
Diamond, supra note 5, at 561-62 (noting the use of more realistic study techniques
have been substantially adopted in most modern jury studies).
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elicit more realistic responses by encouraging participants to
forget (or at least downplay) the fact that the consequences are
not real. 32 Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that subjects
will behave more closely to real life simply by virtue of increased
realism. 33
Furthermore, this may turn out to be
inconsequential. 34 A 1999 meta-analysis of twenty years of jury
simulation research concluded that such measures appear to
have little systematic effect. 35 More to the point, they do not
directly address the hypothetical bias issue.36 In fact, given the
lack of any incentive to compel such behavior it is reasonable to
assume that at least some participants will continue to deviate
from what their real life response would be; 37 in even the most
realistic studies, a very high level of hypothetical bias may still
be present.
Some researchers have adopted an incentive-aligned
methodology for addressing hypothetical bias that rewards
38
individuals based on the outcome of their decision.
Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey, for example, conducted an
experimental study of the rules underlying jury voting behavior
using opaque jars of colored balls representing the state of the
world:
blue (which was analogized to innocent) and red
32 SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON
TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 18 (1988) ("[W]e can say, as a general rule,
that the more closely our research conditions approximate the real event, the better
off we are trying to generalize from the former to the latter."); Cahoy & Ding, supra
note 3, at 48-49.
33 See Bornstein & McCabe, supra note 5, at 448 ("[E]xperimental
methodologies used by researchers are becoming increasingly sophisticated and
legally realistic. Nonetheless, an experiment is ultimately still an experiment,
raising the issue of whether any simulation can meaningfully speak to real-world
legal questions.").
34 See MacCoun, supra note 8, at 512 ("It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that
efforts to maximize realism on these dimensions have more to do with research
marketing than scientific validity ....).
35 Brian H. Bornstein, The Ecological Validity of Jury Simulations: Is the Jury
Still Out?, 23 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 75, 76-84, 88 (1999) ('Two decades of additional
research support Bray & Kerr's conclusion, regarding the ecological validity of jury
simulations, that 'the pattern of results does not warrant the negative reactions of
some evaluators.' ").
36 Bornstein himself concedes that, while his 1999 study asserted that the
ecological validity of simulation studies supported their continued use, it "turned a
blind eye" to the consequentiality issue (as does most other jury simulation
research). Bornstein & McCabe, supra note 5, at 450 & n.32.
37 See Smith, supra note 29, at 274-79 (1976).
38 See Serena Guarnaschelli et al., An Experimental Study of Jury Decision
Rules, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 407, 408 (2000).
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(analogized to guilty). 39 One would obtain a "signal" as to the
overall composition of the jar by individually viewing the color of
one ball from the jar and voting accordingly. 40 The incentive to
vote correctly was provided by the fact that, for each round of
voting, all jurors were paid fifty cents for a correct decision on the
4
composition of the jar and five cents for an incorrect one. '
It is clear, however, that straight application of personal
incentives in jury simulation study may produce misleading
results. This is because the missing incentive in jury simulation
is not personal utility (as in the contexts commonly studied in the
hypothetical bias literature), but rather social utility. Real jurors
do not gain money by delivering a well-thought-out verdict, nor
do they lose money even if they deliver a random verdict. 42 Real
jurors derive significant utility knowing that, if they make the
right decision, both the plaintiff and defendant will receive what
43
they truly deserve.
This distinction is no small matter. The social utility
literature suggests such "non-self' utility can be critical in
shaping an individual's decisions.
For example, subjects
systematically deviate in dictator and ultimatum games from
normative predictions that are based on pure self-interest;
results from bilateral bargaining experiments show that only a
fraction of the subjects care about more than material payoffs to
themselves. 44 The empirical results of Kahneman, Knetsch, and
Thaler are particularly relevant in this regard. 45 They devised
an environment wherein an individual may choose one of two
39 Id. at 407-08.
40 Id. at 408.
41 Id. at 412.
42 Bornstein & McCabe, supra note 5, at 464-65 (distinguishing between the
incentives provided by common experimental economics research with those present

in a real jury case, and suggesting that it makes such research less applicable to
mock juries).
43 Id. at 454.
44 See, e.g., Colin Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Ultimatums,
Dictators, and Manners, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 209, 210-12, 216 (1995) (assessing the
validity of the dictator and ultimatum games' non-self results and their deviation
from game theory outcomes).

45 See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Fairness and

the Assumptions of Economics, 59 J. OF Bus. S285, S288 (1986) (analyzing how
fairness effects individuals' decision-making choices using three different studies);

see also Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Fairness as a
Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728
(1986).
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persons with whom to share a certain amount of money, knowing
that one had made an unequal offer in a previously played
ultimatum game while the other made an equal offer. 46 The
payoff is such that the individual obtains more money if he or she
chooses to share with the first person (unequal offer). 47 However,
a majority chose to share with the second person (equal offer)
even though it meant that the individuals also received less
money. 48 The result suggests individuals are willing to sacrifice
their personal gain to punish past unfair behavior, even when
such behavior was not directed towards them.
Given the misleading nature of standard incentive
mechanisms in the context of jury studies, it is critical to devise a
mechanism that simulates the social utility of real juror
experience. Without the proper alignment of decision-making
incentives, an understanding of the true behavior of individuals
in jury simulations may not be achieved.

II. AN INCENTIVE-ALIGNED MECHANISM FOR SOCIAL UTILITY
To create a mechanism that effectively replaces the missing
elements of real-world decision-making, one must identify all of
the components in play. A comprehensive analysis is necessary
to accomplish this goal.
In addition to the conventional
components such as personal financial benefit, this analysis must
explicitly incorporate the social utility an individual derives from
making a correct judgment for third parties.
Once the
components are identified, it is possible to articulate a proxy
incentive mechanism that could be used in mock jury research
that will mimic the social utility experience by actual jurors.
A.

Mathematical Framework of Juror Utility

A juror's utility has three major components. The first
component is the disutility arising from to the effort (ei) that an
individual, i, must expend to fulfill jury duty. The effort includes
the time to complete the decision-making task as well as
additional burdens such as appearing at the courthouse, time
away from work and/or family, etc. However, a juror may spend
significantly more effort beyond the minimum if the problem is
46
47

48

Kahneman, supra note 45, at S290-92.
Id. at S290-91.
Id. at S291.
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complex, and the juror wishes to ensure that the best decision
results.
The second component is the personal utility that can be
derived from the decision.
In other words, how the juror
personally benefits. This can be further divided into direct and
latent personal utility. Direct personal utility includes the cash
payment or publicity a juror receives. Latent personal utility
includes personal gains from the decisions made by the jury. For
example, an individual without health insurance may derive
latent benefits from a ruling that he or she perceives will better
enable competitors to bring down the cost of pharmaceuticals.
Alternatively, jurors may see latent benefits to a ruling that
sends a message consistent with a social or political agenda. The
most prominent example of this latter motivation is "jury
nullification," wherein a jury appears to purposely disregard the
law in reaching a verdict (often because it is perceived to be
unjust).4 9 Note that the degree of latent personal gain depends
positively on the effort spent to achieve the desirable outcome,
while the direct personal utility does not. One may define
u i, (ei) as individual i's personal utility, u iP as the direct
personal utility, and ui,' (e i ) as the latent personal utility:
uP(ei) = u' + uj(e ) (1)
The third component is the social utility derived from
making the correct judgment for third parties. It can be further
divided into two parts, which includes participation utility and
justice utility.
The participation utility is the utility an
individual derives from the knowledge that he or she has fulfilled
one's responsibility as a citizen. The justice utility depends on
the welfare of the parties actually involved in the case; it reaches
a maximum if the juror makes the correct decision, and becomes
smaller the farther the decision is from the correct one. Note
that the degree of justice utility depends positively on the effort
spent to understand a case and make an educated decision, while
participation utility does not. If one defines u i, (es) as individual
i's social utility, u , as the participation utility, and u (e i ) as
the justice utility, the relationship is as follows:

49 See Lars Noah, Civil Jury Nullification, 86 IOWA. L. Rev. 1601, 1604-05
(2001) ("Nullification occurs whenever a jury intentionally ignores the trial judge's
instructions on the applicable law.").
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u 0i+ uis (e i ) (2)

The utility function for individual i as a juror is thus:

U (e) =ui,(e)+uis(e)
=Ui? + u!(ei) +u?-ei

uis(ei)- ei (3)

In most cases, a juror will be unable to derive latent personal
utility. In this case, the utility could be simplified as:

Ui(ei)=uip +uO + u' (ei)-ei(4)

B. An Incentive-Aligned Mechanism for Implementing Social
Utility
While a real juror experiences the utility tradeoff as specified
in equation (3), mock jurors who participate in jury simulation
studies have quite a different utility function. Since the study is
hypothetical and there is no real consequence to the juror's
decision, a mock juror does not experience any social utility.
Furthermore, he or she will also have no latent personal gain. As
a result, the mock juror's utility is simply:
Ui (ei) = u' - ei (5)
ip

In view of the missing incentive components, it seems clear
that the subject's decision is likely to suffer from hypothetical
bias.
Most troubling is the fact that the missing utility
components are functions of the effort, rather than a constant
(which only help to determine whether to participate). As a
result, a mock juror will likely spend effort that is substantially
different in nature from that which he or she would spend if juror
were participating in an actual case.5 0 Because the missing
incentive has positive utility, one expects that the mock juror will
devote substantially less effort to decision-making.
To correct for the hypothetical bias, it is important that an
incentive-aligned mechanism be implemented to give a mock
juror additional utility that is consistent with that which would
exist for a real jury. Of the three missing utility components
50 MacCoun, supra note 8, at 513-14 (noting that the most straightforward

consequence of hypothetical bias "is that real jurors may try harder than mock
jurors-think harder, deliberate longer and ponder more deeply," but arguing that
the available literature does not clearly establish this effect).
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(ui (e), ui, and ui'(ei)), the first two can be readily remedied. The
component uiP(e,) -arguably uncommon in most litigation-could
be remedied by allowing an individual to receive additional
personal compensation if the decision follows the pattern
suggested by the self-interest bias under study. Similarly,
component u is could be added back to a mock juror's utility by
paying that juror an additional fixed amount of money.
utility
I On the other hand, the third component, justice
(U is (e
), is the most critical and presents the biggest
challenge for researchers and practitioners. While there are
potentially many ways to implement such a corrective
mechanism, we believe that three necessary conditions should be
satisfied by all such mechanisms:
(1) The incentive mechanism must reflect social utility (or
utility derived from rearranging welfare distribution among
third parties) instead of personal utility;
(2) The incentive mechanism must reward the effort in a
similar manner as it would in a real jury context; and
(3) It is important that the mechanism be flexible enough to
accommodate heterogeneity across different types of cases.
With these conditions in mind, it is now possible to articulate
a particular embodiment of the incentive-alignment mechanism
outlined above.
C.

The PracticalApplication of an Incentive-Aligned Mechanism
for EliminatingBias

One can imagine a generic incentive-alignment mechanism
that is adaptable to a variety of legal cases in order to simulate
actual juror utility. The participants are asked to apply unique
and complex law and facts gathered substantially from the
information provided during the study. Social utility is mimicked
by establishing that a certain amount of money is at issue in the
case and must be divided between two parties (the plaintiff
receives what is required to compensate for the defendant's
wrongful act, and the defendant keeps the rest). Participants
should understand that is a legally correct division of money (the
"reference decision"), and any deviation from that will unfairly
punish one party while rewarding the other party undeservedly.
The proposed mechanism-explained to the mock jurors
before a jury simulation study and imposed after they complete
their verdicts-involves the following steps: (1) experimenters
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identify two parties a priori, such that one party is generally
considered to be deserving of a monetary gift (such as a wellrespected charity like UNICEF), and the other party is generally
considered to be undeserving of such largesse (such as a passerby
in the street);51 (2) upon completion of the experiments, the
experimenters randomly pick a mock juror and compare his or
her verdict to the reference decision (e.g., legally correct
decision), and the percentage of deviation from the reference
decision is calculated (e.g., 20%); and (3) experimenters then
divide a certain amount of money (e.g., $200) such that the
undesirable party (e.g., passerby) receives the total amount
multiplied by the deviation (e.g., $200*20%=$40), and the
desirable party (e.g., UNICEF) receives the rest ($140). This
mechanism thus provides a mock juror with social utility, the
magnitude of which (the amount of money the desirable party
receives) is dependant on the mock juror's ability to deliberate
52
the case in a legally correct manner.
The mechanism is flexible and can be used to accommodate
specific cases by changing the following three elements: (1) the
two parties used, (2) the total amount of money to be divided, and
(3) the relationship between the deviation and division of money.
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
To test the effectiveness of the proposed incentive structure,
the authors conducted two experiments implementing the
structure, and the results were compared to a control group
under a conventional hypothetical condition.
To more
realistically demonstrate the application of the mechanism, the
authors used a specific context. The experiment utilized a
problem that is becoming quite common in high stakes mock jury
analysis: an intellectual property infringement case in which a
juror is required to assess the appropriate amount of money
(damages) to award to the plaintiff (i.e., subsequent to a
determination of liability). However, the authors concede that
assessment of some essential aspects of jury behavior, such as
51 These two parties do not correspond to the two parties involved in litigation
(defendant and plaintiff), but rather, they represent two states of outcome (a
desirable outcome and an undesirable outcome).
52 Of course, a person who does not care about social utility will behave no
differently when this mechanism is used, but this is quite realistic, as such a person
would not take social utility into consideration if that person were a real juror.
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deliberation, 53 were sacrificed in the interest of economy and
clarity of results (though an approximation is employed). The
methods should be equally effective if additional methodologies
are added. 54 On the other hand, design problems that plague
previous assessments of consequentiality in jury studiesnamely, ensuring that participants believe the outcome of the
consequential arm is "real"55-are far less an issue here because
there is in fact no deception.
A.

Experiment One

To achieve high external validity, realism in design was
considered in concert with a format that would yield statistically
significant and replicable results. The experimental context
(legal case) and individual decision-making in a group
environment were primary foci.
1.

Experimental Design
A very realistic and complex legal case, loosely based on the
facts of a real litigation that took place in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Massachusetts, 56 was prepared for the study.
It permitted the simulation of the conditions of a typical jury
study to ensure that any observed effects could be generalized. It
also ensured that subjects were not tested simply on abstract
math skills by requiring subjects to grasp legal and factual
aspects of the case as real jurors do.
The hypothetical case involved a patent on a method of
producing large quantities of erythropoietin (a protein that
stimulates red blood cell production) in tissue culture cells.5 7 The
53 See Bornstein & McCabe, supra note 5, at 459 (stating that "the lack of jury
deliberations in experimental studies has been identified as one of the major threats
to external validity and policy relevance").
54 Such additions are probably required to firmly establish that relevant
hypothetical bias is occurring and addressed by the proposed method. It is, however,
beyond the scope of this initial work.
55 Bornstein & McCabe, supra note 5, at 457-58.
56 Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 69 (D. Mass.
2001). Note, however, the alleged acts of infringement described in our experiment
were entirely fictional and should not be attributed to the either of the parties
involved in that case. Because the case was more complicated and ended in a bench
trial rather than a jury trial, the outcome is not directly comparable to our
experimnental results.
57 All study instruments are on file with the authors and available upon
request.
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patent's owner sued a competitor for making use of
erythropoietin production methods that allegedly infringed the
plaintiffs patent. The study participants were given detailed
facts surrounding the development and sale of the two
companies' erythropoietin products as well as the law regarding
patent infringement and damages. 58 The participants were
informed that the liability phase of the case was already decided,
with the defendant found to have infringed the plaintiffs patent,
and the only remaining task was to decide the damages the
defendant owed for the infringement over the time period
involved in the case. The question of infringement damages was
divided into six specific periods, each of which required an
answer.
Determining damages in a case like this is often quite
complex, hinging on such facts as a party's actual sales and
whether the plaintiff would have been able to make additional
sales if the defendant had not been on the market. The facts
were written such that a single legally correct 59 answer existed
for each of the six time periods, but could be derived only with
significant mental effort. The key elements in each problem and
the correct and most likely incorrect answers are summarized in
Table 1.

58 The statements of law were derived from model jury instructions that are
used in actual trials. See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS'N, GUIDE TO MODEL

PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS

(1998),

available at http://www.aipla.org/Content

/ContentGroups/ Publications i/Guide toModelPatentJuryInstructions.htm.
59 The legally correct damages amount could be determined by applying the law
to the facts contained in the test instrument.
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Table 1. Experiment 1 Problems and Answers
Prob.

LegallFactual Issue

Correct

Answers from Common

Answer

Mistakes

$9,000

(award plaintiff lost profits

If the plaintiff can make no sales, a
royalty is the sole measure of

$90,000

damages

damages)
$900,000

Plaintiff can obtain lost profits for

(award plaintiff lost profits

defendant's sales within plaintiffs

for all sales)

excess sales capacity; royalty for the

$90,000

rest

(award royalty for all
sales)
$1,800,000

For lost profits damages, plaintiff

(award plaintiff lost profits

must demonstrate by a

for all sales)

preponderance of the evidence a

$180,000

reasonable probability of lost sales

(award royalty for all
sales)
$945,000
(misread facts and award

Evidence sufficient to justify lost

royalty for 500 units)

profits must be relevant

$1,800,000
(award plaintiff lost profits
for irrelevant speculation)
$900,000
(accord improper weight to

A reasonable probability of lost sales
5

cannot be defeated by the mere
possibility of a different outcome

speculative argument)
$1,800,000

$2,700,000
(award plaintiff lost profits
based on excess capacity
instead of lost sales)
$1,800,000
(award lost profits for

One cannot obtain any damages after

period after patent

the expiration of a patent, even if the

expires)

defendant was unaware of the

$990,000

expiration

(award lost profits for half
sales instead of sales
occurring in half year)
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Actual jurors make decisions in a group environment in
which they are exposed to each other's opinions while arriving at
their own final determination. This is a key element of juror
deliberation that the experiment intended to replicate in a
carefully controlled manner. 60 The design involved providing
study participants with the additional information one would be
exposed to in a real jury; specifically, multiple (different) answers
to a given question and the percentage of people in the group that
adhere to each. This design allows for the precise control over
the amount of information to which each participant is exposed.
In the experiment, two or three possible answers are provided for
the questions, each answer being associated with a percentage of
prior jurors who have selected it. The various answers were
obtained from the most common calculations observed in a pretest set of experiments (e.g., percentages of subjects producing
the correct answer and the most common mistakes, see Table 1).
Clearly, the use of such percentages presented a problem.
Should the correct answer always be assigned to the highest
percentage (i.e., treating it as the majority opinion)? If so, the
simple, effortless, and commonly adopted strategy of agreeingwith-the-majority will necessarily lead to the correct answer and
confound the hypothetical bias to be tested. One can assume that
the outcome (how many individuals reach the correct answer)
could be contaminated. 6 1
Conversely, the phenomenon of
majority bias would not affect the outcome if the correct answer
were not presented as the majority opinion. However, perceptive
and careful subjects could become suspicious of the overall test
design if "majority" answers are never correct.
A creative
solution was necessary to address this complication.
To rectify the majority bias issue, half of the questions from
the case were selected and the majority answer was retained as
correct (1, 2, and 4), while half of the responses were changed to
reflect an incorrect majority opinion (3, 5, and 6). The obvious
60 Alternate means of simulating group decision-making exist, but would be
problematic for a proof of concept analysis. For example, one could assign

individuals to a group and allow them to talk within their group before final
deliberation. This has two major limitations: (1) it is hard to control the discussion
and dynamics within each group; and (2) the group effectively becomes the unit of
analysis, which makes it prohibitively expensive to obtain multiple data points in
the experiment.
61 Interestingly, it is hard to predict, a priori, who is more likely to adopt this
strategy, a subject in the hypothetical condition or a real juror.
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downside to this solution is that meaningful results from
subjects' answers to the majority-correct questions could no
longer be obtained. Therefore, the analysis and discussion must
62
necessarily focus on the majority-incorrect questions.
2.

Experimental Procedure

Subjects were undergraduate business students at a large
U.S. university.
They randomly signed up for one of two
sessions. A total of twenty-five (25) subjects showed up for the
first session and were used for the hypothetical condition. After
signing an informed consent form, 63 each subject was given a
handout consisting of general instructions, a summary of facts
and law involved in the case, and a special verdict form that
requested answers for the aforementioned six time periods. The
subjects were permitted to read and complete the special verdict
form at their leisure. It took about twenty to forty minutes for all
subjects to complete the study.
A total of twenty-eight (28) subjects appeared for the second
session, which was used for the incentive condition. Before the
start of the session, one subject was asked to go outside the
classroom and find a random student walking by the building.
That subject was to explain to the potential recruit that he or she
would receive a minimum of $10 for coming to the classroom and
remaining for about forty-five minutes to an hour (during which
time that person could quietly do as he or she wished). The
recruit was also informed that there was a possibility that he or
she would receive substantially more money-up to $100depending on the outcome of the experiment going on in the
classroom. A female undergraduate student was eventually
recruited and introduced to all subjects in the classroom; none of
the subjects were acquainted with the recruit.

62 Technically, on the jury forms used in the experiment, a subject had the
option to accept a majority opinion even if it is different from his or her own
calculated answer. In the experiments described below, however, a negligible
number of participants acted in this fashion, and there were no significant
differences between the hypothetical and incentive conditions. Thus, the data
analysis presented in this paper provides only the actual answers each subject
stated regardless of whether they chose to defer to the majority opinion or not. This
helps to capture individual decision outcome, but the results are substantially
unchanged if we replace these answers with the majority opinion.
63 Approvals for human subject research were obtained by the authors for all
experiments described herein. Documentation is available upon request.
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The same experimental handouts used with the hypothetical
group were then distributed to the subjects. They were asked to
read the general instructions carefully, scan the summary and
special verdict form, and then stop. The experimenter then put
$100 in cash on the table in front of the group and described on
the blackboard, lecture style, how their answer would be used to
divide the $100:
Two parties were designated, the first being the recruit in the
room, the second being the Make-A-Wish foundation
(introduced by showing the subjects the Foundation's website on
a large projection screen which detailed its mission). 64 One of
the subjects would be randomly selected at the end of the
experiment, and one out of the six answers on that subject's
verdict form would be randomly chosen. The subject's answer
for that selected question would be used as the basis for
dividing the $100 between the two parties (unless the subject
marked an option that stated "I will agree with the majority
even though my answer is different," in which case the majority
answer would be used instead).
Subjects were shown by example how the experimenter
would calculate the percentage of deviation (if any) between the
subject's answer and the correct answer: If the subject's answer
is $2500, and the correct answer is $2000, the deviation is (25002000)/2000=25%. The result would be the same if the subject's
answer were 25% below the correct answer. The deviation is
bounded by 100% more than the correct answer; any answers
above that will be treated as 100% deviation (e.g., a $10000
answer has an effective deviation of 100% even though (100002000)/2000=400%). The product between the $100 cash and the
percentage of deviation would be the amount of money presented
to the student recruit, and the remainder would be sent to the
Make-A-Wish Foundation. In the preceding example, $25 would
go to student recruit and $75 to the Make-A-Wish Foundation.
Additional examples were given where the subjects were asked to
figure out the resulting division to ensure they understood the
incentive.

64 The Make-A-Wish Foundation is a well-known national charity that grants
the last wishes of terminally ill children. The authors are not aware of any political
or religious affiliation on the part of the Foundation.
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Results

It was predicted that subjects under the incentive conditions
would behave differently, even though they do not benefit
personally from the outcome. A direct prediction of the result of
this enhanced effort is that more of these subjects would obtain
the correct answer. To verify this prediction, the responses to the
three questions that were free of the confounding effects
discussed above were studied.
To examine the performance across questions, the number of
subjects with the same answers was counted, and the numbers
tabulated into four groups corresponding to either one of the
three presented answers or all other answers that did not match
any of the presented ones (see Table 2).
Table 2. Cross Question Results in Experiment
Quest. 3
Hypo.
9
(36%)

Quest. 5

165

Quest. 6

2nd

10

Common
Opinion

(40%)

Incent. Hypo.
10
10
(36%)
(40%)
10
9
(36%)
(36%)

3rd

3
(12%)

2
(7%)

3
(12%)

1
(4%)

6
(24%)

3
(11%)

3
(12%)
25
(100%)

6
(21%)
28
(100%)

3
(12%)
25
(100%)

3
(11%)
28
(100%)

2
(8%)
25
(100%)

2
(7%)
28
(100%)

Majority
Opinion

Common
Opinion
Other
Opinions

Incent.
6
(21%)
18
(64%)

Hypo.
6
(24%)
11
(44%)

Incent.
6
(21%)
17
(61%)

As predicted, subjects in the incentive condition performed
better for questions 5 and 6. In question 5, 64% of subjects in
incentive conditions obtained the correct answer, compared to
36% in the hypothetical condition, and the difference is
statistically significant based on the chi-square test (p=0.00). 66
The second common opinion is the correct answer for all three questions.
We used the percentage in the hypothetical condition as the expected
percentage for the incentive-aligned condition.
65

66
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For question 6, 61% of subjects in the incentive condition were
correct, compared to 44% in the hypothetical condition, and this
difference is significant (p=0.07). These findings provide strong
evidence that individuals indeed act differently under the
proposed incentive structure as compared to the pure
hypothetical condition. An additional interesting observation is
that for question 5, but not for question 6, the number of subjects
that have the same opinion as the majority is significantly higher
in the hypothetical condition compared to the incentive condition
(p=0.04).
Unfortunately, the results for question 3 appeared to suffer
from a problem in the construction of the instrument. Following
the experiment, subjects were interviewed and it was discovered
that the question could be interpreted in more than one way. An
answer designated as wrong-the majority answer-could in fact
be considered legally correct if the question were read in a
particular light. Subjects putting in the most effort may have
chosen an incorrect answer.
Therefore, responses for this
question are ambiguous and appropriately discarded.
Next, examined performance at the individual level was
studied. The number of the questions in which a subject
provided the correct answer was counted (0, 1, 2, or 3). Given our
assessment that question 3 was ambiguous, we also examined
the result for questions 5 and 6 only (0, 1 or 2). Both results are
included in Table 3.
Table 3. Individual Performance in Experiment 1
Number of
Questions
Correctly
Answered

2

3

Quest. 3, 5, 6

Quest. 5, 6

Hypo.

Incent.

Hypo.

Incent.

7
(28%)
9
(36%)
7
(28%)
2

4
(14%)
7
(25%)
13
(46%)
4

10
(40%)
10
(40%)
5
(20%)

5
(18%)
11
(39%)
12
(43%)

(
(8%)

4
(14%)

N/A

N/A
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It is clear that subjects in the incentive condition performed
better in terms of total correct answers, and the difference is
statistically significant based on chi-square test (p=0.06). The
same observation holds when question 3 was removed (p=0.00).
These results suggest that the incentive-aligned group appeared
to have a better grasp of the facts and law presented in the
summary and worked harder to obtain the correct result.
Lastly, the average answer of question 5 and question 6 was
calculated and studied. The average is a useful measure because
it permits one to determine whether the group as a whole has
moved toward a more accurate result, or if the numbers of correct
or near correct answers are washed out by the magnitude of
incorrect ones. If one were attempting to obtain an overall
picture of the group response-such as determining a likely jury
verdict for a given group of individuals--one would wish to know
whether the results could be different in the incentive-aligned
group. Because the amount of deviation would not necessarily be
a function of effort, the outcome seems inherently unpredictable.
It could differ from case to case, and within a case it may depend
on the specific question asked.
We plotted (see Figure 1), for questions 5 and 6, the correct
answer, the average of those in the incentive condition and
those in the hypothetical condition. 67 As suspected, results for
questions 5 and 6 are not the same.
Figure 1. Average Answers for Each Question
2000

1800
1600
E

1400
1 200
1000
Question 3

Question

5

uestion

6

0 u e s tio n
S..,,--C
-- <:-

orrect

Exp

1 -- Hypo

---

Exp 2 -- Hypo

.- *---E

-.

--

E xp 2 -- Incentive

xp 1 -- Incentive

67 We omitted Question 3 here for two reasons. First, the question is ambiguous
as discussed above, and second, we plotted the results for both experiment 1 and
experiment 2 in the same graph for ease of comparison, and Question 3 in
experiment 2 has a different correct answer
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The average in the incentive condition is statistically smaller
than the correct answer (p=0.02), and it is marginally
statistically higher than the average in the hypothetical
condition (p=0.08). For question 6, however, the averages in the
incentive and hypothetical conditions are not statistically
different (p=0.31).
While experiment 1 provides strong support for the general
predictions in this paper and the validity of the incentive
structure, it does have a major limitation. The impact of the
third-party players could be inconsistent. In general, the MakeA-Wish Foundation appears to be an appropriate party to inspire
largess because it is almost universally acceptable to potential
subjects and
accessible
to future experimenters
and
practitioners. However, the other party-a randomly selected
passerby-could
provoke
different responses
from the
participants depending on his or her identity. For example
(although there is no evidence it impacted Experiment 1), it is
possible that an unusually physically desirable or needy passerby
may make subjects indifferent between dividing money between
the Foundation and the passerby. With this issue in mind, the
nature of the third parties and other aspects of the experiment
were modified for the next round of studies.
B. Experiment Two
Experiment 2 was undertaken with three methodology goals
in mind: the replication of the positive results from experiment
1, the implementation of a remedy for the ambiguous nature of
experiment l's Question 3, and the use of a more objective party
than the random passerby. Additionally, the underlying reasons
for the differences between the hypothetical and incentivealigned group were sought. Given the fact that the incentive
mechanism rewards social utility, it was predicted that a bigger
difference would be observed for those subjects who care more
about social welfare. The analysis here focuses on Questions 3, 5,
and 6.68
1.

Experimental Design and Procedure
The instrument used in experiment 2 was the same as in

68 The results for the other three questions have been assessed and are
available from the authors upon request.
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experiment 1, except for the following: (1) question 3 was
modified to eliminate the ambiguity; 69 (2) a new embodiment of
the incentive structure was implemented; and (3) a brief survey
to understand subjects' preference for socially desirable behavior
was presented at the conclusion of the study.
Again, subjects were undergraduate business students
recruited from a large U.S. university approximately two months
after the completion of experiment 1 (none of them participated
in experiment 1). They randomly signed up for one of two
sessions, each of which was further split into two groups. To
ensure that there was no difference between the two groups in
each session, all subjects were first placed in a single room and
half of the subjects were randomly selected and then moved to a
different room. One room was used for the hypothetical condition
and one for the incentive condition. There were a total of thirtythree (33) subjects in the hypothetical condition and thirty-two
(32) subjects in the incentive condition.
For the incentive condition, the subjects were informed as to
how $100 would be divided between two parties as in
experiment 1 except that the counter party to the Make-A-Wish
Foundation was different. The subjects were told instead that
any deviation of the randomly selected result from the correct
answer would result in the corresponding money being
completely wasted. Specifically, the money would be used to
purchase expensive coffee (or coffee beans) from a Starbucks caf6
on campus, which would then be promptly dumped down a drain
(coffee) or into a trash can (coffee beans). The subjects were told
that this would be done immediately following the experiment,
and they were invited to stay and watch. In the experiment, the
randomly selected answer in session 1 resulted in an $83
deviation. Two subjects were paid $5 to go to the caf6 afterwards
and purchased $83 worth of coffee beans that were then dumped
into the trashcan in the classroom upon their return. The random
answer in session 2 was 100% correct, thus all $100 went to the
Make-A-Wish Foundation.

69 To obtain the correct answer, a participant must derive from the study
instrument the legal point that a reasonable probability of lost sales cannot be
defeated by the mere possibility of a different outcome (compare to Table 1). The
correct answer is $1,800,000, and two likely incorrect answers are $990,000 (accord
improper weight to speculative argument) and $180,000 (award royalty for all sales).
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After each subject completed his or her deliberation, the
subject was asked to take a short survey after turning in the
verdict form. 70 The short survey was intended to measure social
desirability by employing "[a] summated ratings scale purporting
to measure the degree to which people describe themselves in
socially acceptable terms to gain the approval of others."7 1 It was
originally developed by Crowne and Marlowe 72 and has been used
extensively in the behavioral literature. 73 The total scores range
from zero to thirty-three, and a person with higher score tends to
respond to questions in a socially desirable manner, whereas a
person with lower score is less likely to answer the question that
way.
2.

Results

Similar to experiment 1, the aggregate outcome for questions
3, 5 and 6 by problem was examined first (Table 4). Consistent
with the prior results, 59% of the participants were observed to
have chosen the correct answer in the incentive condition for
question 5 versus 36% in the hypothetical condition.
This
difference is statistically significant (p=0.01). The number of
people who selected the majority answer was statistically
smaller in the incentive-aligned condition as compared to the
hypothetical condition (p=0.01).

70 On file with the authors, and available upon request.
71 GORDON C. BRUNER II ET AL., 3 MARKETING SCALES
COMPILATION OF MULTI-ITEM MEASURES 616 (2001).
72 See Douglas P. Crowne & David Marlowe, A New

HANDBOOK:

A

Scale of Social Desirability

Independent of Psychopathology, 24 J. CONSULTING PSYCH. 349, 350-51 (1960)

(describing how the authors developed the social desirability scale).
73 See, e.g., David Glen Mick, Are Studies of Dark Side Variables Confounded by
Socially Desirable Responding? The Case of Materialism, 23 J. CONSUMER RES. 106,
107 (1996) (explaining that the Marlowe-Crowne Scale is the most popular socially
desirable responding scale); Richard G. Netemeyer et al., Trait Aspects of Vanity:
Measurement and Relevance to Consumer Behavior, 21 J. CONSUMER RES. 612, 617
(1995) (stating that when measuring vanity traits "an often ignored aspect of scale
development is testing for social-desirability bias"; Marsha L. Richins & Scott
Dawson, A Consumer Values Orientation for Materialsim and Its Measurement:
Scale Development and Validation, 19 J. CONSUMER RES. 303, 310 (1992) (utilizing
the social desirability scale to determine whether materialism is susceptible to the
social desirability bias).
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Table 4. Cross Question Results in Experiment 2 74

Majority
Opinion
2nd Common
Opinion 75
3rd Common
Opinion
Other
Opinions

Quest. 3
Hypo. Incent.
14
14
(42%)
(44%)
10
15
(30%)
(47%)
4
1
(12%)
(3%)
5
2
(15%)
(6%)
33
32
(100%) (100%)

Quest. 5
Hypo. Incent.
17
9
(52%)
(28%)
12
19
(36%)
(59%)
0
3
(0%)
(9%)
4
1
(12%)
(3%)
33
32
(100%) (100%)

Quest. 6
Hypo. Incent.
13
6
(39%)
(19%)
14
18
(42%)
(56%)
3
4
(9%)
(13%)
3
4
(9%)
(13%)
33
32
(100%) (100%)

For question 6, it was 56% versus 42%, however, unlike
experiment 1, the difference was not statistically significant
(p=0.11). On the other hand, the number of people who selected
the majority answer is statistically smaller in the incentivealigned condition as compared to the hypothetical condition
(p=0.02). Interestingly, the percentage of subjects who obtained
the correct answers under either condition was very close in both
experiments. For question 5 in experiment 1, the percentage of
correct answers was 64% and 36% for incentive and hypothetical
conditions, respectively. For question 6 in experiment 1, it is
61% and 44%, respectively. This high consistency provides
another piece of evidence for the robustness of this paper's
hypothesis and experimental design. It is also worth noting that
this consistency also holds true for those who have selected the
ihajority opinion (which is wrong in these questions), but only for
those in the incentive condition. To a large extent, this supports
the notion that results in the incentive condition are more
consistent across different runs of the same experiment (with
different subjects), while the hypothetical condition subjects are
driven by various home grown preferences, and their actions may
be less consistent when they did not obtain correct answers.
74 Once again, the second common opinion is the correct answer for all three
questions.
75 Once again, the second common opinion is the correct answer for all three

questions.
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As predicted, after we revised question 3 based on subject
feedback, we found the percentage of subjects who obtained the
correct answer to be significantly higher in the incentive
condition (47%) as compared to that in the hypothetical condition
(30%) (p=0.04).
This result confirms the observations for
questions 5 and 6 from both experiments.
When we examined the data at the individual level,
consistent with Experiment 1, we found significant improvement
of performance (p=0.00).
Table 5. Individual Performance in Experiment 2
Number of
Questions
Correctly
Answered

2

Questions 3, 5, 6
Hypothetical

Incentive

9

6

(27%)
15
(45%)

(19%)
7
(22%)
12
(38%)
7
(22%)

6
(18%)
3
(9%)

The averages of the answers for each question are plotted in
the same figure as those from experiment 1 for ease of crossexperiment comparison (Figure 1). Remarkably, the averages in
the incentive condition are very similar between the two
experiments for questions 5 and 6, respectively. Again, this
provides additional evidence of the robustness of the incentive
structure. For question 5, the average in the incentive condition
is significantly lower than the correct answer (p=0.0 4 ), but
significantly higher than the average in the hypothetical
condition (p=0.00). This result is consistent with that obtained in
experiment 1. For question 6, the averages in the incentive and
hypothetical are not statistically different from each other
(p=0.68). For question 3, the average in the incentive condition is
significantly lower than the correct answer (p=0.00), but
significantly higher than the average in the hypothetical
condition (p=0.02).
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Finally, the hypothesis that the individuals on whom the
incentive structure has the greatest effect are those who care a
great deal about third-party utility and doing the right thing for
others was investigated. The total scores for subjects were
calculated on the social desirability scale (ranging from one to
thirty-three) for each subject and we plotted the distributions of
these scores for both hypothetical and incentive conditions
(Figure 2).
Figure 2. Distribution of Socially Desirable Answers
for Each Subject
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The average score across subjects was 13.9 with standard
deviation of 5.7 in the hypothetical condition, and 14.5 for the
incentive condition with standard deviation of 5.5. Although it
may appear that the incentive condition has more subjects who
exhibit social desirability, the average of the scores are not
statistically different (p=0.35). Thus, the measures of social
desirability also serve to provide evidence that samples for both
conditions are equivalent. Since the distribution of scores in both
conditions is close to normal with symmetric tails on both sides,
the subjects were divided into three groups: (1) those (roughly)
within one standard deviation of the average, (2) those (roughly)
above one standard deviation from the average, and (3) those
(roughly) below one standard deviation from the average. The
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individual level of performance (how many questions a subject
has answered correctly) was then calculated for subjects within
each of the three groups, for both hypothetical condition and
incentive condition (Table 6).
Table 6. Cross Individual Performance Segmented
Based on Preference of social desirability in
Experiment 2, Questions 3, 5, 6
Social
76
Desirability

Hypothetical
1.17
(0.97)
1.13
(0.94)

High

0.75

(0.25)

77

Incentive
1.83
(2.16)
1.5
(0.97)
1.7178

(0.9)

While the average performance in the incentive condition is
better than that in the hypothetical condition in all three groups,
the only group where such an increase is significant is for
subjects in the high social desirability group (1.71 for the
incentive condition, compared to 0.75 in the hypothetical
condition). This result supports the hypothesis that, if the
incentive condition makes people work harder, which in turn
leads to a higher probability of correct answer, the difference
within the hypothetical groups is expected to be most significant
for individuals with high social desirability values.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The economic behavior of participants in studies intended to
simulate contexts wherein a person other than the participant is
affected by the outcome is a relatively unexplored field. The
experiments herein demonstrate that such behavior can be
significantly influenced by the presence of an incentive76 The subjects are grouped into three segments, Low (those below 1 SD of the
mean (scores 1-9)), Medium (those within 1 SD of the mean (scores 10-19)), and High
(those above 1 SD of the mean (scores 20-30)).
77 Average, with standard deviation in parenthesis.
78 The average is significantly higher in the incentive condition compared to the
hypothetical condition, among those with high social desirability (p=0.028).
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alignment mechanism.
Such a mechanism can cause
participants to perform more accurately, suggesting that they
commit more time and effort. The fact that the incentives are
similar in nature to those experienced in real world contexts
creates a strong presumption that their use can make
simulations more realistic and useful.
The results are likely to have particular importance in the
context of jury simulations. Americans rely on the results of such
79
studies to determine how to best reform the judicial system.
Questions such as what types of trial procedures may evoke
prejudice or to what degree do jurors benefit from note taking are
paramount for both real and perceived equity. These inquiries
are substantially informed by simulations, and it is essential that
the accuracy of this work be raised to the highest level possible.
Moreover, the business world is dramatically affected by
litigation; knowing when to settle or pursue one's case in court
often hinges on predictable jury information, 0 a product of
simulations. This paper suggests that the use of the incentivealignment mechanism detailed herein may be essential to
obtaining the most accurate results from studies concerning
groups like juries. Although ignoring the hypothetical bias
occurring in the absence of the mechanism may not pose
significant problems in every case, it is impossible to know for
sure. In general, the use of such incentives should be a no-lose
situation.
It is worth imparting some words of caution regarding the
meaning and transferability of the results. First, although the
incentive-alignment mechanism described herein is in the same
category as the incentive experienced by actual jurors, and it has
been demonstrated that the mechanism does indeed increase
subject performance, one cannot state conclusively that this
performance is actually closer to that of an actual jury. While it
is logical to at least make the assumption that real juries are
more accurate than hypothetical juries, they may be less accurate
than subjects using our mechanism, particularly if the incentive
is too strong. Unfortunately, this complication is highly fact
79

See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.

See Cahoy & Ding, supra note 3, at 36 (asserting that the substantial risk
often attached to jury trials is especially "unacceptable in the context of financiallysignificant cases, and the urge to avoid the risk-by early settlement on undesirable
terms, if necessary-is great").
80
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specific, and would be impossible to prove conclusively without
either (1) conducting several studies in the context of on-going
litigations in the hope that one of the cases studied happened to
be one of the very few litigations that ended in a jury trial as
opposed to settlement or (2) reverse-engineering a realistic jury
study starting with a decided case.
The former would be
prohibitively expensive and the latter would be exceedingly
difficult to conduct in an objective manner, knowing the outcome
of the litigation. To ensure that such an aberration does not
occur, the authors suggest that future experimenters choose an
incentive that is less strong than that experienced by an actual
jury (though necessarily stronger than the hypothetical).
Second, it must be acknowledged that other aspects of jury
behavior may blunt the effect of hypothetical bias. For example,
the dynamics of group decision-making could have the effect
of reducing (or amplifying) the consequentiality effect.
Additionally, the particular question at issue in a study
(e.g., damages, racial bias, etc.) may be more or less subject to
hypothetical bias. Therefore, the authors do not argue that the
above results render all mock jury research inherently invalid or
unreliable. Moreover, when contributing behavioral factors are
not accounted for, the described mechanism will likely not
provide complete verisimilitude. This article merely suggests
that non-self economic incentives may provide an important new
technique for addressing a seemingly intractable research
problem. The authors hope that this work will be carried on and
expanded upon in many contexts to demonstrate its impact.
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